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“I will inhabit my name” writes the poet St John Perse1 to 
highlight how the name can make a person and symbolise his/her 
 
∗  Doctor in Law; Lecturer, University of Essex (United Kingdom). 
1. ST JOHN PERSE, EXIL, VI (1942).  Alexis Saint Léger, French citizen of 
Guadeloupe, took the pseudonym of Saint John Perse.  Some also translate as “I 
will live my name.” 
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identity.  Certainly, a person cannot be reduced to a name as Juliet 
warns us:  
What's in a name?  That which we call a rose 
By any other name would smell as sweet; 
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd, 
Retain that dear perfection which he owes 
Without that title.  Romeo, doff thy name, 
And for that name which is no part of thee  
Take all myself.2  
Nonetheless, “a necessary and usual sign of personality, the 
name concentrates personality and expresses it.”3  Some cultures 
even believe that changing names could cure a person of ill-
health.4  Embodiment of a person, the name is protected both in 
article 24-2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and in article 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties.  
It thus should not come as a surprise that both England and 
France declare that the name cannot be object of a property right.  
Though the name embodies so much of a person, it cannot be 
considered as a thing or good on which one holds property rights.  
So to the question “is the name property?” the answer is a 
straightforward “no.”  End of the matter then?  Not quite.  The 
study of Du Boulay v. Du Boulay,5 where the Privy Council 
affirms the English law position, reveals that France and England 
did not have the same approach in 1869.  The case revolved around 
the question of what protection French law, as applied in the 
Caribbean island of Saint Lucia, offered to the person whose name 
was used by another.6  If the Privy Council concluded that French 
 
2. W. SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, Act 2, Scene 2, lines 43-48 
(1594). 
3. R. NERSON, LES DROITS EXTRAPATRIMONIAUX 33 (LGDJ 1939). 
4. J. Carbonnier refers to the oriental beliefs that to change a person’s name 
when ill will cure this person.  1 J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL: LES PERSONNES 
190 (PUF 1957). 
5. Du Boulay v. Du Boulay, L.R. 2 PC 430 (1869). 
6. Because the Treaty of 1815, which marked the end of Napoleon’s 
Empire, conceded to the United Kingdom the Caribbean island Saint Lucia, 
former French colony alongside Martinique and Guadeloupe, French law was 
applicable at the time.  Martinique, from where the plaintiffs originated from, 
and Guadeloupe remained French territories.  For a history of Saint Lucia, see 
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law offered no protection because the various pertinent legislations 
in question had not been introduced in Saint Lucia for specific 
registration, it did not dispute the fact that the said legislation was 
presented as embodying a “property right” in the name.  And 
indeed, in 1869, the traditional justification in French law courts, a 
justification which dated back to the 18th century, was that the 
name is property, albeit a different kind of property than that of 
other goods or things.  Only at the very end of the 19th century was 
this perception overturned,7 allowing, in that respect, French law 
to become identical to English law.  But why, then, did France 
maintain for so long a position so contrary to that of England?  Can 
the name be related to property?  Do we have to revise the taken-
for-granted distinction between persons and things, at least for the 
name? 
The question is even more puzzling when one compares in 
detail the French and English laws of surnames.  Indeed, despite 
now the common affirmation that there is no property right on the 
name, English and French laws differ significantly in their 
specifics, and that difference appears to challenge their shared 
agreement on the name not being property.  English law considers 
that a person is at liberty to change name with no limit other than 
that of not committing fraud; correlatively, a person cannot forbid 
a stranger to use his/her name: “the mere assumption of a name, 
which is the patronymic of a family, by a stranger who had never 
before been called by that name, whatever cause of annoyance it 
may be to the family, is a grievance for which our Law affords no 
redress.”8  Those two attributes of English law reinforce the idea 
that a person does not seem to “own” his/her name: s/he exercises 
a liberty which stretches as far as allowing him/her to assume 
different names, whatever inconvenience such attitude can create, 
as long as there is no fraud.  
By contrast, to an outsider, French law can appear to create a 
property right or at least a proprietary interest in the name.  Indeed, 
 
 
H. BREEN, ST LUCIA: HISTORICAL, STATISTICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE (Longman, 
Brown, Green and Longmans 1844), available also on Google Books. 
7.  See Du Boulay.  The doctrine played a major role in this evolution which 
became accepted “truth,” despite sporadic decisions of the courts affirming the 
contrary until mid-twentieth century, See Cass. Civ., March 1st, 1957 BULL. 
1957, 2, 129; Cass. Civ., June 11th, 1963, GAZ PAL. 2, 290 (1963). 
8.  Du Boulay.   
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contrary to what happens in English law, a person cannot change 
names on his/her own accord and has various rights of action 
before the courts, notably when someone else uses his/her name 
without his/her consent, even if there is no fraud.  It is as if the 
plaintiff “owns” his/her name and that “ownership” is sufficient to 
trigger legal protection against any use of the name “owned.”9  
And yet, French law is adamant that there is no property right in 
the name.  
 One can only wonder how English and French laws, opposite 
in their features, can nonetheless reach the same conclusion.  
Surely, one or the other got it wrong?  Could it be French law, as it 
used to affirm exactly the contrary until the early 20th century?  
The Privy Council case of Du Boulay seems to suggest so.  
However, the topic deserves a more thorough investigation, 
especially when one looks at the third feature of the law of 
surnames, i.e. whether a person can or cannot dispose of his/her 
name by contract or by will.  
 In English law a will can be drafted so as to include a “name 
and arms” clause, which typically transfers the land or any other 
property to another person on the condition that he (or more rarely, 
she) takes the name of the testator.  This possibility to dispose of 
one’s own name seems to contradict completely the English law’s 
affirmation that a person has no property right to his/her name.  
This time, is it English law that misunderstood the true nature of 
the name?  
Comparison with French law only increases the confusion.  
Indeed, in France, a person cannot transfer his/her name by will or 
even by contract, a prohibition that seems to confirm the claim that 
there is no property right to the name in French law.  But then, how 
can it be reconciled with the other components of the French law 
of surnames, which seem to suggest the contrary? 
To provide the beginning of an answer to those various 
questions, we will first have to go back in time, at least for French 
law.  As the work of the French legal historian Anne Lefebvre-
Teillard demonstrated, the French law of surnames has changed 
dramatically since the Middle Ages, whereas English law, as far as 
we could gather, does not seem to have undergone any profound 
 
9. See R. Munday, The French Law of Surnames: A Study in Rights of 
Property, Personality and Privacy, 6 LEGAL STUDIES 79, 88-90 (1986). 
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transformation.10  This evolution of French Law affected not only 
its features, but also the different theoretical rationales it developed 
to explain those features.  
Compared with English law, this analysis will shed new light 
on our original question–“is the name property?”–in view of the 
three elements of the law of surnames: whether a person can or 
cannot dispose of one’s own name (I), protect it (II), and change it 
(III). 
 
I. TO DISPOSE OF ONE’S NAME:  
SYMBOL OF A PROPERTY RIGHT? 
 
Roman law recognized that a person could dispose of his name 
(gens) by requiring a beneficiary of a donation or a will to bear his 
name in exchange for receiving the goods or property.11  Whether 
this practice survived the collapse of the Roman Empire in the 5th 
century is unclear, but it somehow reappeared in the Middle Ages 
in connection with arms and land possessed by the nobility.  In 
English law, “inserted in a will or settlement by which property is 
given to a person,”12 the name and arms clause imposes on him 
“the condition that he shall assume the surname and arms of the 
testator or settlor, with a direction that if he neglects to assume or 
discontinues the use of them, the estate shall devolve on the next 
person in remainder.”13  
To what extent this ancient practice to dispose of one’s own 
name is used nowadays is difficult to say, for the last legal 
challenge was in 1962.14  Yet it remains a feature of modern 
English law, whereas French law currently ignores it.  “Currently” 
must we emphasize, because until the mid-nineteenth century, the 
practice was still alive.  English and French laws of surnames have 
not always diverged in their features (A), albeit the theoretical 
 
10. A. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, LE NOM: DROIT ET HISTOIRE (PUF 1990).  
11. See H. HOULLIER DE VILLEDIEU, DE LA PROPRIETE DES NOMS 
PATRONYMIQUES EN DROIT ROMAIN ET EN DROIT FRANÇAIS 32-34 (Oudin 
Poitiers, thèse 1883); and E. PERREAU, LE DROIT AU NOM EN MATIERE CIVILE 
153-154 (Sirey 1910). Both authors cite De Officiis by Cicero.  
12. E. JOWITT, THE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW (Sweet & Maxwell 
1959), v. “Name and arms clause.” 
13. Id.  
14. In Re Neeld, Carpenter v. Inigo-Jones and others, CA (1962) All E.R. 
335, (1962) Ch. 643. 
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justification by which French lawyers explained this opportunity to 
dispose of one’s own name promotes a reassessment of whether 
the name is property or not (B). 
 
A. The Practice: French Variations and English Constancy 
 
The name and arms clause is one of those features English law 
seems to have always known but whose origins are quite uncertain.  
According to Lord Evershed, “the existence of clauses of this kind 
for a hundred years or more in the precedent books and the absence 
until 1945 of any reported attempt to challenge their validity is, I 
venture to think, somewhat impressive;”15 a statement which Lord 
Upjohn affirmed: “Names and arms clauses have been known for 
the best part of two hundred years.”16  Certainly, cases attesting of 
the practice go back up to the 18th century, but it is probably safe to 
presume that the clause, regarded as “relics of feudalism” by a 
modern commentator,17 was introduced around the 12th century 
when surnames appeared and started to symbolise a noble 
household, its reputation, and its wealth.  Originally used by the 
nobility, the clause allows for an estate to remain within the 
family, under its name and arms, in a situation where the latter 
would have disappeared, if it were not for the clause.  
In accordance with custom, for the name and the law of arms, 
only direct male heirs are entitled to take the name and arms; in 
their absence, name and arms cease to be transmitted to the next 
generation and simply disappear.  So although the land and the 
related property would be transmitted to the family through the 
remaining female line, the connection between land and name, and 
possibly coat of arms, would be lost.  To avoid such possibility, a 
testator who wishes to maintain his name and arms alive will use a 
name and arms clause, requiring his daughter, her children and/or 
her spouse, or even his nephew, to bear his name and arms as a 
condition to inherit the estate or part of the estate18 given.  Failure 
to comply with the clause would simply lead to the loss of the 
 
15. Id. at 344 (dissent). 
16. Id. at 354. 
17. O. M. Stone, Name Worship and Statutory Interpretation in the Law of 
Wills, 26 MOD. L. REV. 652, 656 (1963).  
18. Barlow v Bateman, (1730) 3 P Wms 65. 
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estate, which would pass in remainder to the next person identified 
in the will, who also would have to take the name and arms.  
The effectiveness of the clause in passing names, in connection 
to estates, to several generations down the line is best illustrated in 
In Re Neeld 19 decided by the Court of Appeal in 1962.  T, the 
testator, devised a will where two names and arms clauses were at 
stake: one by which the name Inigo-Jones should be used, and 
another by which the name and arms of Neeld should be taken.  
What is interesting is that the first name was the testator’s initial 
surname, before he changed it in 1941 to comply with a name and 
arms clause, that of Neeld, as settled in Neeld’s will in 1855, 
nearly a century before.  In other words, one clause was a way of 
perpetuating his own name (Inigo-Jones) despite his change of 
surname; the other clause allowed for the other name (Neeld) to be 
maintained, by making sure that the original name and arms clause 
drafted in 1855 would still be complied with by the second and 
third generations.20  Obviously, ensuring the diversity of names 
was not the sole purpose of the second clause:  there were property 
interests at stake that the testator did not wish to forfeit.  
Notwithstanding, the name and arms clause is an effective means 
to secure the use of a name that would otherwise become 
extinguished. 
Such possibility to transfer one’s own name to future 
generations had not always found approval.  In 1766, Lord 
Mansfield considered the clause as “silly;”21 and it is true that 
nowadays the clause appears to be “a relic of a bygone age,”22 for 
some, “English law . . . show[ing] far too much tolerance of the 
mythology which the dead past imposes on the living present.”23  
Not surprisingly then, from 1945 onwards, a series of cases 
threatened the clause’s existence.  The courts held a number of 
clauses too uncertain in their requirements, e.g. the testator not 
specifying when the change of name must be effective.24  They 
 
19. In Re Neeld. 
20. Id. at 338. 
21. Gulliver d. Corris v Ashby, (1766) 4 Burr 1930, 1941 (“so silly a 
condition as this is”). 
22. In Re Neeld, at 466 (Cross J.). 
23. Stone, supra note 17, at 657. 
24.  Re Bouverie, Bouverie v Marshall, (1952) 1 All ER 408, (1952) Ch. 40; 
Re Woods Will Trusts, Wood v Donnelly, (1952) 1 All ER 740, (1952) Ch. 406; 
Re Murray, Martins Bank Ltd v Dill, (1955) Ch 69, (1954) 3 All ER 129, CA; 
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also declared the clauses contrary to public policy “in so far as they 
affect the names of married women or their husbands”25 and force 
either the wives not to adopt their husbands’ or husbands to adopt 
their wives’ family name.  The courts’ eagerness “to control these 
relics of feudalism”26 came to a halt in 1962 when the Court of 
Appeal concluded that the “wind of change developed against 
these clauses in a number of authorities . . . was but a light, fickle 
and variable breeze.”27  Even the dissenting Lord Evershed 
thought that “if clauses of this king, which have been part of the 
conveyancing system in our country for very many years, ought 
now to be treated as contrary to public policy, that is a matter for 
Parliament rather than for the courts.”28  Parliament not having 
intervened, the name and arms clauses continue to be a feature of 
English law of surnames, allowing people to transfer their own 
names, and sometimes their coats of arms, at the same time as their 
property. 
In the 21st century, the contrast with French law could not be 
more striking.  Modern French law ignores such possibility, and 
the clause is conspicuous by its absence in current law books.  Yet, 
like in English law, the name and arms clause had been a feature of 
the French law of surnames for hundreds of years.  The clause was 
part of the mechanism of the saisine, a concept born in the Middle 
Ages.  Literally, saisine means the action of seizing, of taking over 
and in that sense, there may well be a connection with the English 
concept of seisin which refers to feudal possession.29  Legally 
though, the saisine is the use of a “thing” (chose) corporeal or 
incorporeal which closes, with time passing by, the possibility for 
others to complain about it.30  
 
 
and Re Howard's Will Trusts, Levin v Bradley, (1961) Ch 507, (1961) 2 All ER 
413. 
25. Stone, supra note 17, at 656. 
26. Id. at 656. 
27. In Re Neeld, at 354 (Lord Upjohn, for the majority). 
28. Id. at 347. 
29. The scope of this article did not allow us to investigate the matter, but it 
would be an interesting subject for a legal historian.  See for example, E. LEHR, 
ELÉMENTS DE DROIT CIVIL ANGLAIS § 368 (Larose-Forsel 1885), who uses the 
term of “saisine” to translate the “livery of seisin” of English law.  Whether the 
author knew of the Middle Ages concept remains to be investigated, in a future 
research project. 
30. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 44. 
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Applied to the name,31 the saisine has exactly the same feature 
as the name and arms clause in English law.  It will allow for the 
use of the name by persons other than those in the direct male line 
and who are still part of the same household.  Indeed, a nobleman 
who has only daughters or has no heirs at all can transfer, to his 
son-in-law, grandson, or nephew, his name which would otherwise 
become extinguished for lack of direct male heirs.  The clause 
would be inserted either in his daughter’s wedding contract or in 
his will, often on the condition that if other collateral male heirs 
exist they would consent to the transfer.32
Like in English law, assumption of the name was sufficient to 
satisfy the clause.  After all, the saisine is about the use of the 
name for a certain period of time–the longer the better.  Still, on 
both sides of the Channel, those who changed their name to 
comply with a clause may wish to secure their new name (and 
position) by seeking the Crown’s approval, in the form of, in 
French law, a letter patent,33 and in English law, a royal licence, an 
Act of Parliament, or more rarely a letter patent.34
With similar origins as its English counterpart, the name and 
arms clause in old French law served the same purpose: 
perpetuating a name in connection with arms and an estate, 
primarily within the nobility.  Hence, the French Revolution, with 
its quest to abolish any sign associated with the nobility, should 
have seen the disappearance of the clause.  However, despite its 
feudal origins, the practice survived the turmoil of the Revolution. 
In the first half of the 19th century, the Cour de cassation 
(hereinafter, Court of Cassation) the French supreme court for civil 
and criminal matters, and even the Conseil d’Etat (hereinafter, 
 
31. The “saisine” has been used in other areas, like inheritance law.  See P. 
OURLIAC & J. L. GAZZANIGA, HISTOIRE DU DROIT PRIVE 207-209 (1985). 
32. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 46; 2 DENISART, COLLECTION 
DE DECISIONS NOUVELLES ET DE NOTIONS RELATIVES A LA JURISPRUDENCE 
ACTUELLE  256 (Desaint 1766); and 12 GUYOT, REPERTOIRE UNIVERSEL ET 
RAISONNE DE JURISPRUDENCE CIVILE, CRIMINELLE, CANONIQUE ET BENEFICIALE 
175 (Visse 1784). 
33. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 107-109. 
34. One is recorded in 1317 about arms, in DOM PEDRO DE ALCAZAR, LAWS 
OF ARMS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND, available at 
http://www.sca.org/heraldry/laurel/lexarm.html (last visited November 6, 2008).  
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Council of State),35 decided a few cases attesting to the use of 
name and arms clauses either in wedding contracts36 or in wills.37
But that the practice survived was a Pyrrhic victory, and by the 
second half of the 19th century, English and French laws stopped 
converging.  Indeed, the context in which the clause was born and 
has developed has fundamentally changed in France, but not in 
England.  Whereas the liberty to change names remained in 
English law, it was abolished in French law with the law of 6 
fructidor an II (1794).  From then on, nobody could assume a new 
name by reputation as was the practice before the Revolution, or as 
is still the practice in English law.  In order to use a new name, one 
has to ask for an official change of name prior to that use and in 
accordance with the administrative procedure established by law of 
11 germinal an XI (April, 1803).  Copied more or less on the 
administrative procedure used before the Revolution for the letters 
patent granted by the King,38 the procedure means that the person 
has to establish what would later be called a “legitimate reason” to 
change his name.39  
Whether a name and arms clause can constitute such 
“legitimate reason” after the Revolution is unclear.  The procedure 
is mainly administrative and only extensive research in the French 
Government’s archives would allow for an accurate answer.  
However, one case of 1831 shows that the French Government, at 
least in the early 19th century, was not necessarily adverse to the 
name and arms clause.40  An ordonnance (hereinafter, ordinance) 
of 1815, taken in accordance with the procedure of 1803, 
authorised the son-in-law to take the names (and title) of his wife’s 
father,41 once the latter died.  Better, the same case reveals that 
sixteen years later, the Council of State, the French ‘supreme 
court’42 for administrative matters, is not hostile per se to the 
clause.  Indeed, the court considered that the period of one year to 
 
35. CE, December 16th, 1831 S. 1832 II 103. 
36. Cass. Civ., January 13th, 1813, S. 1812-1814, 1, 259. 
37. Cass. Req., November 16th, 1824, S.V. 1822-1824, 1, 561; S. 1825, 1, 
148.  The case was actually cited by the plaintifs in Du Boulay. 
38. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 128-130. 
39. The requirement is in the French Civil Code, article 60 al.1. 
40. CE, December 16th, 1831 S. 1832 II 103. 
41. Id.  
42. Until the law of May 24th, 1872, the Council of State was not fully 
independent (possibility for its decisions to be overturned). 
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oppose the ordinance does not start at the time when the ordinance 
was granted but at the time when the condition realises itself, i.e., 
here, at the time when the father dies and leaves his name to his 
son-in-law.  In other words, the Council of State adapted the 
administrative procedure to the specific features of the name and 
arms clause.  
Even the Court of Cassation may not be completely opposed to 
the name and arms clause in this first half of the 19th century.  
Indeed, in 1813, the Court rejected the argument that to promise to 
bear another’s name as part of a wedding contract is, in principle, 
contrary to the law of 6 fructidor an II.43  Thus, the lack of liberty 
to change one’s name established by this law does not render the 
name and arms clause invalid per se.  However, it does endanger 
its survival, even though there may not be a direct antagonism to 
the practice.  Indeed, the loss of liberty to change one’s name goes 
hand in hand with the obligation to comply with the procedure set 
out in the law of 11 germinal an XI, an obligation that the French 
courts, whether Council of State or Court of Cassation, enforce 
strictly.  
As a result, as long as the beneficiary of a name and arms 
clause does not use the procedure, he will be considered as not 
having complied with the clause.  This is so even if he believed he 
had already been authorised to change his name because the 
French Government had granted an ordinance stating he could 
change his name, but obviously without having respected the 
procedure of law of 11 germinal an XI.44  
This loss of liberty to change names renders the name and arms 
clause a much less attractive tool in French law.  Its drafter runs 
the risk that his wishes may not be respected despite the 
willingness of those benefiting from the clause to comply with it.  
If we add the fact that the procedure is costly45 and involves a risk 
of the request being rejected by the Government, in the long term 
the clause would only lose its appeal and by the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards, there is no case law attesting of the practice.46  
 
43. Cass. Civ., January 13th, 1813 S.1812-1814, 2, 259. 
44. CE, December 16th, 1831 S. 1832, 2, 103; Cass. Req. April 22nd, 1846 S. 
1848 I 417. 
45. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 190 and n. 9.  The procedure 
became less costly closer to the 20th century. 
46. The last case is of 1846: Cass. Req., April 22nd, 1846 S. 1848 I 417. 
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Certainly, the clause is still mentioned in books related to 
donations and wills, but the authors never cite a case less than fifty 
to sixty years old, and they all affirm the necessity to comply with 
the procedure of law of 11 germinal an XI.47  
In 1910, E. Perreau suggested that the clause was rarely used 
and he noted indeed that “for more than sixty years, our case law 
reports do not contain any decision on this question.”48  Thereafter 
the clause ceased to be mentioned anywhere.  Hence, after 
centuries of similar practice, French law finally departed from 
English law.  The impossibility to assume one’s name by 
reputation without prior authorisation finally got the better of the 
name and arms clause.49  This is however only part of the story.  If 
the name and arms clause disappeared in French law, it is also 
because it faced a new challenge at the end of the 19th and 
beginning of the 20th century.  Associated with the concept of 
property until then, the name and arms clause could only be 
affected by the movement among French scholars to condemn the 
idea that the name could be property, an idea which will be from 
then on considered as the correct interpretation of what the name 
is.  In that sense, French and English law have never been so far 
apart, for even if English law does not consider the name property, 
it still allows for the name and arms clause to be used in contracts 
and wills. 
 
47. See M. TROPLONG, DES DONATIONS ENTRE VIFS ET TESTAMENTS, OU 
COMMENTAIRE DU TITRE 2 DU LIVRE 3 DU CODE NAPOLEON 276, §256 (H. Plon 
1872): la condition de prendre le nom du testateur est très légale, et elle met 
l’héritier dans l’obligation d’y satisfaire,” the author however cites no other 
cases than a 1836 one (July 4th, 1836, D. 1836, 1, 302); id. G. BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE & M. COLIN, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL: 
DES DONATIONS ENTRE VIFS ET DES TESTAMENTS 77, §  177 (Larose 1895). 
48. PERREAU, supra note 11, at 156. 
49. Nowadays, the Council of State refuses to grant a change of name as a 
condition to execute a will or to the person wishing to take that of his mother. 
See respectively, D. Pepy, Les changements de nom dans le droit français, in 
ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL D’ETAT 1966-67 31, 36; and F. Bernard, Le 
Conseil d’Etat et les changements de nom, ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL 
D’ETAT 1977-1978 67, 78. The law 57-133 of February 8th, 1957 (following a 
law of July 2nd, 1923) remedied only partly to the loss of names due to lack of a 
direct male line.  See I. De Silva, Le changement de nom devant le Conseil 
d’Etat: le relèvement du patronyme menacé d’extinction. Conclusion sous CE n. 
236470 du 19 mai 2004, REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 
1153, 1159 (2004); and F. Petit, La mémoire en droit privé, RRJ 17, 38-39 
(1997). 
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B. The Theoretical Justification of the Practice: Dispelling 
Confusion 
 
Confusion stems as much from the evolution French law went 
through, as from French law contrasted with English law.  Until 
the early 20th century, the name was considered to be property in 
French law, in contradiction to the English law’s understanding 
that the name is not, as the Privy Council reminded the plaintiffs in 
the 1869 case of Du Boulay.  Afterwards, because of the 
movement among French scholars in the 1900s, French law 
adopted what is apparently the same position as English law, but 
on grounds which make one wonder if the two laws of surnames 
mean the same thing.  To dispel this confusion, we must first 
understand English law’s approach to the act of disposing of one’s 
name, for it reflects on French law’s original conception of the 
name.  This initial analysis will shed light on the subsequent 
rationales French law had adopted, highlighting where the 
confusion lies. 
In Du Boulay the Privy Council affirmed for the first time the 
accepted understanding that the name was not property in English 
law.  Strictly speaking, the case does not involve a name and arms 
clause, but rather raises the issue of whether a person can protect 
her/his name against use by another in English law.  Nonetheless, 
the judgment’s wording is broad enough for the decision to 
encompass the name and arms clause within its declaration that the 
name is not property.  A comparison between the name and the 
arms or the title reinforces this conclusion.  Indeed, a title is “an 
incorporeal and impartible hereditament, inalienable and 
descendible.”50  In other words, it is property,51 though it cannot 
be  
 
50. 35 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 906, at 568 (4th ed. 1994) v. 
“Peerages and Dignities.” See notably Earl Cowley v Countess Cowley, (1901) 
AC 450, at 457-458. 
51. Note that the first meaning of the word “title” is not a dignity, but refers 
to “a right of property . . . with reference either to the manner in which the right 
has been acquired or as to its capacity of being effectively transferred,” 
OSBORN’S CONCISE LAW DICTIONARY (Sweet & Maxwell, 10th ed. 2005), v. 
“Title.” 
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sold.52  Similarly, arms are considered property,53 although “the 
right to bear arms is a dignity conferred by the Crown, and not an 
incorporeal hereditament.”54  
As a consequence, both title and arms are protected against 
assumption and use by another without grant,55 whereas the name 
can be assumed and used freely without formality.56  If there is “a 
personal right to bear arms”57 and title, there is no right to bear 
name, just a liberty to do so.  Thus, to dispose of one’s own name 
in a will is not a sign of a right of property on the name, but rather 
the exercise of the liberty to make one’s will conjoined to the 
liberty to assume names by reputation.58  It is not so much about 
disposing of or transferring a thing, object of property, than 
exercising a liberty to assume a name in order to be able to 
maintain its existence.  The fact that English Law insists so much 
on the name and arms clause being a voluntary assumption of a 
name rather than a transfer of it can be seen in Doe d Luscombe v 
Yates (1822)59 where the beneficiary of the will had assumed the 
testator’s name of Luscombe before he came into possession of the 
estate, i.e. before the name and arms clause took effect.60  If the 
 
52. A contract for the purchase of a title is contrary to public policy and 
void.  Parkinson v College of Ambulance Ltd and Harrison, (1925) 2 KB 1. 
53. Stubs v Stubs, [1862] 1 H & C. 257; In re Croxon, Croxon v. Ferrers, 
[1904] 1 Ch. 252, 258.  Note that the common law courts do not have 
jurisdiction, see HALSBURY’S, supra note 50, at § 970, p. 599. 
54. 42 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 749 (4th ed. 1994) v. 
“Settlements”; and Manchester Corpn v Manchester Palace of Varieties Ltd, 
(1955) P 133, (1955) 1 All ER 387. 
55. Title: Earl Cowley v Countess Cowley, (1901) AC 450, 460; see 2 
JARMAN ON WILLS 1532, 1533 (8th ed 1951).  
Arms: In re Croxon, Croxon v. Ferrers, (1904) 1 Ch. 252, 258; In re Berens, 
In re Dowdeswell, Berens-Dowdeswell v. Holland-Martin, (1926) 1 Ch. 596, 
604-605; and Barlow v Bateman, 3 P. Wms 65, on appeal (1735) 2 Bro Parl Cas 
272, HL. 
56. Doe d Luscombe v Yates, (1822) 5 B & Ald 544; Davies v Lowndes, 
(1835) 1 Bing NC 597; Bevan v Mahon-Hagan, (1893) 31 LR Ir 342, CA; and  
Barlow v Bateman, (1730) 3 P Wms 65.  
57. In re Berens, at 605. 
58. In re Neeld, at 353-354; Re Howard's, at 523; In re Berens, at 604-605; 
and Du Boulay, at 447. 
59. Doe d Luscombe.  
60. John Luscombe Manning was required to assume the name of 
Luscombe once he had “attained the age of 21 years” and be entitled to the 
estate.  However, during his minority, he assumed the testator’s name of 
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name and arms clause was a transfer of the name-property, the 
name could not be used before the clause became effective, i.e. 
before Luscombe inherited the estate.  However, Luscombe, like 
any disposee, did not need the clause to be able to bear the name: 
he retained the possibility to assume the testator’s name, whether 
or not the latter drafted the clause. 
That English law puts the emphasis on the liberty to assume 
another’s name rather than on the transfer of name-property by the 
testator does not surprise when compared to what we know of the 
origin of the name and arms clause in French law.  The French 
medieval concept of saisine is the prolonged use of a “thing” that 
does not create a right of ownership, but that extinguishes the right 
of others to complain about the use.61  Like in English law, what 
matters is that there is an assumption of a name for a period of time 
long enough for the person to secure the use of his name, a bit like 
an adoption, rather than a donation.62  The emphasis is on the 
liberty to change name rather than on the testator’s supposed right 
to transfer the name.  And because, like in English law, the French 
saisine is neither property nor possession, the name is not property, 
but rather the object of an exercise of liberty.  But whereas English 
law will retain this approach, French law will progressively drift 
away from it by superposing the concept of property on the notion 
of saisine and its related feature, the name and arms clause. 
The association between name and property results from a 
combination of factors which taken separately are not conclusive 
and demonstrate how problematic the assimilation between name 
and property can be.  It all started when, at the end of the Middle 
Ages, French lawyers ceased to understand the concept of the 
saisine.  Trained in Roman law, they turned towards the more 
familiar concepts of possession and property to explain the features 
of the saisine.  In his commentaries of the Justinian Code, Balde († 
1400) affirmed that the name was bien hors du commerce (a thing 
outside commerce), in order to highlight the fact that the right on 
the name as known in the saisine does not incorporate the right to 
 
 
Luscombe and was known thereafter by this surname instead of his own 
surname. 
61. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 44. 
62. Id. at 46. 
36              JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES                  [Vol. 1 
 
                                                                                                            
sell the name.63  The link he established between the name and 
“goods” (biens) made it tempting later on to try to qualify the right 
attached to the name, and what is better suited than the right to 
property, which concerns goods?64  
Under that light, the clause mechanism seems to point towards 
an act of disposition, indicative not of possession, but more of a 
property right on the name.  There is a donation of a name rather 
than an adoption as it was understood in the Middle Ages.  The 
onus is thus on the transfer from testator to disposee rather than on 
the disposee’s liberty to assume a new name.  For French lawyers, 
this correlation between name and property is comforted by the 
fact that the surname has become hereditary in the sense that the 
father gives his name to his children.  Again, the emphasis on the 
person who “transfers” the name rather on the one who “receives” 
it. 
This use of Roman law to reshape rationales underlying 
existing practices is not surprising.  France, like most continental 
countries, had been deeply influenced by Roman law–much more 
than England ever had been.65  So although French and English 
laws continue to recognise the name and arms clause and the 
liberty to assume a new name, by the late 18th century, the 
rationale provided changed dramatically, introducing confusion 
about what the name is and is not.  
The artificial character of the link made between name and 
property can be seen in the wording used to describe the French 
law of surnames, just before the 1789 Revolution.  In 1780, one of 
the most important encyclopaedias of French law, the Repertoire 
Guyot, stated that “the name is an inalienable property of each 
family and household.  It suffices to enjoy this property/ownership 
to be a male descendant of who bears the name.”66 One can 
immediately see that the features of the original saisine remain:  
the name cannot be sold, and the name and arms clause, used 
mainly by the nobility because the name is a symbol of the 
 
63. Id.  
64. Id. at 83. 
65. Even the seisin, which we do not know so far whether it is related to the 
saisine, is described as feudal possession, implying a different kind of 
possession than that of Roman law.  OSBORN’S, supra note 51, at v. “seisin.” 
66. Desessarts, in GUYOT, supra note 32, at 168 (author’s translation and 
emphasis added), also cited in LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 84, n. 
149.  
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household, depends on the existence, or rather absence, of a male 
line to which the name can be transferred.  Thus, the declaration 
that the name is property is more a standard clause than the result 
of a careful analysis of both the name and the concept of property.  
The forgotten saisine which remains in its features has been 
dressed up with the ill-suited concept of property. 
This evolution of French law would not have had such an 
impact if it were not for the success the new explanation enjoyed in 
the 19th century.  Far from being dispelled, the confusion found a 
new life, except that it was not perceived as such, but rather as the 
correct view of what the name is.  The case of Du Boulay is a 
testament to this understanding of the law.  The plaintiffs whose 
arguments were based on French law cited the Dictionnaire du 
Notariat (Dictionary of the Notary), affirming that the name is 
property.67  One would then think that when the presentation was 
criticised in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the confusion 
would disappear.  Certainly, scholars demonstrated that the name 
could not be disposed of by the father and thus be hereditary like 
property is.68  So in that sense, one of the factors that led to the 
conclusion the name was property has been rejected.  
However, concerning the name and arms clause, the link 
previously made between property right and liberty to dispose of 
the name is never questioned, even by those maintaining that the 
name is property,69 nor by those considering that the name could 
not be property.  Indeed, the reason why the name cannot be 
property anymore is because it cannot be disposed of . . . by a 
name and arms clause, for the disposee of the clause cannot change 
his name on his own accord but must ask at the very least the 
Government’s authorisation! In other words, instead of 
 
67. Du Boulay, at 440, 443. 
68. M. PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL CONFORME AU 
PROGRAMME OFFICIAL DES FACULTES DE DROIT  § 398 at 152 (LGDJ, 4th ed. 
1906); and 1 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 141 (1952).  
For Planiol, it is the legislation (loi) that obliges the father’s name to be adopted 
as a sign of the father-child relationship.  The criticism is not without 
weaknesses.  If it is true that the Civil Code provides for the nomen to be a sign 
of possessing the status of son or daughter, it is nonetheless notoriously silent 
concerning the surname to be given at birth.  Until the reforms of 2002 and 
2003, custom dictated that the legitimate child should have his father’s name. 
69. SALVETON, LE NOM EN DROIT ROMAIN ET EN DROIT FRANÇAIS 305 (thèse 
1887), cited by PH. NERAC, LA PROTECTION DU NOM PATRONYMIQUE EN DROIT 
CIVIL (ETUDE DE JURISPRUDENCE) 15 (PUF 1979). 
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disappearing, the emphasis put on the testator disposing of the 
name, is strengthened by the disappearance of the liberty to assume 
one’s name.  
The name and arms clause is not analysed anymore as the 
conjunction of two liberties, that of making one’s will and that of 
changing names, but as simply the act of writing a will that 
opposes the principle of immutability of names and that cannot 
therefore survive.  Perreau, at the heart of the movement 
combating the name presented as property in the 1900s, clearly 
links the impossibility to dispose of the name with the prohibition 
to change one’s name at will.  “What instability, indeed, what 
difficulties, what confusion and what frauds, in family and 
business relationships, if anybody could modify his name as freely 
as the composition of his estate (patrimoine)!”70  Thus, Perreau 
associates property with both liberty to dispose of the name and 
liberty to assume another’s name: loss of the latter implies loss to 
dispose of the name and thus loss of property rights.71  
Paradoxically, but easily understandable as the concept of the 
saisine had not yet been rediscovered,72 Perreau’s reasoning 
perpetuates the original confusion introduced after the 15th century, 
whereas the original intention of the author is to dispel the 
confusion between name and property! 
The argument definitely loses its apparent logic when 
compared with English law.  To follow Perreau’s line of reasoning 
means that English law should affirm that the name is property as 
it not only accepts the practice of the name and arms clause but 
also recognises the liberty to change names.  And yet, English law 
refuses to consider the name to be property, clearly distinguishing 
it from the title and arms.  Hence, although English and modern 
French laws appear to agree that the name is not property, their 
understanding rests on an analysis of their respective practices 
which are contradictory.  However, as before, this contradiction 
 
70. E. Perreau, De l’incessibilité du nom civil, REVUE CRITIQUE DE 
LEGISLATION 548, 550 (1900).  
71. “It appears to us that the Government’s authorisation would be 
necessary nowadays, otherwise we would be confronted to a true cession of the 
name”, i.e. to the name being a thing object of property, see Perreau, supra note 
70, at 552. 
72. The major work of A. Lefebvre-Teillard has not yet been written.  In 
addition, legal history has just been introduced as part of the curriculum in 
French law schools. 
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does not rest much on what is property in relation to the name.  
Rather it builds on an historical misconstruction to which has been 
added a new twist by the loss of the liberty to change names in 
French law.  
The introduction of the concept of extra-patrimonial right to 
explain the particularities of the modern French law of surnames 
only reinforces this evolution.  Indeed, at the same time that 
Perreau demonstrated the name cannot be property, he used a new 
concept developed by German scholars as explained by Saleilles73 
and which put the emphasis on what is a person in relation to 
his/her name.  The name is the object of an extra-patrimonial right 
characterised by four elements:  not at disposal, not to be seized, 
not transmittable, and not prescribed by time.74  Opposed to 
property rights, the concept puts the emphasis on what is a person 
intrinsically.  The person’s identity that the name reveals is 
confused with the immutability of the person75 as a human being.  
As a result, it made it difficult for French law to conceive that 
the liberty to dispose one’s name is not a liberty to dispose of the 
person’s identity and essence.  It’s as if to recognise both liberties 
would be allowing the person to sell him/herself like a vulgar 
object of trade, of property.  This particular conception of a person 
marks the divergence between French and English laws.  Thus, 
what is at stake behind the liberty to dispose or not of one’s name 
is not so much a reflection of what is property than a vision of 
what is a person, since the 20th century introduction of the concept 
of extra-patrimonial right in French law.  Whether a similar 
conclusion could apply to the protection of one’s name against the 
use by another remains to be demonstrated. 
 
73. R. Saleilles, Le droit au nom individuel dans le code civil pour l’empire 
d’Allemagne: Note sous l’article 12 du Code civil allemand, REVUE CRITIQUE DE 
LEGISLATION 94 (1900). 
74. Among the many studies about extra-patrimonial rights from which is 
derived the personality right, see NERSON, supra note 3; and P. Kayser, Les 
droits de la personnalité. Aspects théoriques et pratiques, REV. TRIM. DR. CIV.  
45, spec. 492 (1971). 
75. Perreau, supra note 70, at 559; M. Gobert, “Le nom ou la redécouverte 
d’un masque”, I 2966 JCP § 4, 20 (1980); M. Gobert, Rapport de synthèse, in 
LA NOUVELLE LOI SUR LE NOM (ARTICLE 43 DE LA LOI DU 23 DECEMBRE 1985) 
185, 197 (LGDJ 1985); Munday, supra note 9, at 94. Similarly, to the 
philosopher Hume, identity coincides with immutability, Treatise of Human 
Nature (1739), Book I, Part IV, section IV; also quoted in S. FERRET, 
L’IDENTITÉ 20 (GF Flammarion 1998). 
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II. TO PROTECT ONE’S NAME:  
THE EXERCISE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT? 
 
Both English and French laws offer protection against the use 
of a name by another.  Indeed, like Roman law before,76 they 
recognise that a person cannot use another’s name for purposes of 
fraud.77  Beyond this specific situation however they diverge 
significantly.  Even if there is no intention to defraud, French law 
offers to a person legal protection as long as he has not consented 
to the use, whereas English law refuses to do so.  This divergence 
of practice would not have been of any significance for our debate 
if French law had not affirmed for a long time that the name was 
property, implying that the legal action available to protect the 
name was the exercise of a property right on the name.  It is this 
understanding that the plaintiffs in Du Boulay put forward in 
support of their claim that the Privy Council should prohibit the 
defendant to bear the name of Du Boulay.  Not contesting that 
French law recognised a property right,78 the Privy Council 
affirmed the difference with English law:  the “mere assumption of 
a name by a stranger . . . whatever cause of annoyance it may be to 
the family, is a grievance for which our Law affords no redress.”79  
Thus, the traditional interpretation of the case is that in English law 
the name is not property.  Could it be then that to protect one’s 
name against the use by another is a sign of a property right?  An 
analysis of the argument in French law reveals confusion about the 
name being property (A), a confusion the doctrine will try to dispel 
in the early 20th century, offering a specific vision of the name in 
contrast to the English law’s approach (B). 
 
 
A.  The Source of the Confusion  
 
The possibility for a person to oppose the use of her name by 
another arose in the Middle Ages with our already-encountered 
 
76. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 43-46; and HOULLIER DE 
VILLEDIEU, supra note 11, at 36-37. 
77. Du Boulay, at 440-441; Cass. Civ., June 22nd, 1971, D. 1971, somm. 
181. 
78. French law was applicable at the time in St Lucia, id. at § 3. 
79. Id. at 441. 
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French law concept of the saisine.  Indeed, the saisine has two-
tiers: the first, the name and arms clause, is to be exercised when 
the name is about to be extinguished for lack of direct male heirs, 
on the condition that if other male heirs exist they have to consent 
to the transfer; the second, correlative of the first, is for the male 
heirs to protect their “right” on the name by forbidding anybody, 
including close relatives, to bear their names if they have not 
consented that they do so.  
Like for the name and arms clause, what matters is to ensure 
that the noble name remains within the family or persons to be 
trusted, in order to avoid confusion with commoners.  This 
protection of the name as the symbol of a household is particularly 
important in a world where there is, in principle, liberty to use 
another’s name as long as it is without fraud.  If the protection 
were not available, anybody could exercise his liberty to change 
names and take a noble name.  Thus the nobility needs specific 
protection and the saisine provides it by opening a legal action to 
all members of a family who do not need to prove damage or 
fraud.  Those features of the civil action will pass the test of time 
untouched.  However, the original context in which they were born 
will be lost and, like the name and arms clause, by the end of the 
18th century until the early 20th century, the legal action will be 
presented as the exercise of a property right in respect to both the 
holder of the action (1) and the requirement not to prove damage 
(2).  The confusion could not be greater. 
 
1. The Holder of the Action 
 
Because of the purpose served by the saisine, to protect one’s 
name is to protect not simply the name one bears but also the name 
of the family one belongs to but does not bear.  Thus the legal 
action is opened to a variety of persons who have in common their 
interest in maintaining the household name intact.  Because the 
concept of the saisine was misunderstood, as we have seen with 
the name and arms clause, French lawyers started to present in 
1780 “the name [as] an inalienable property of each family and 
household”80 in order to explain the specific characteristic of the 
legal action.  The expression survived the turmoil of the French 
 
80. Desessarts, in GUYOT, supra note 32, at 168, v. “Nom” (author’s 
translation and emphasis added). 
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Revolution, and during the 19th century the courts did not hesitate 
to declare that “the family name is their exclusive property,”81 that 
“the name is part of the persons’ status and belongs exclusively to 
the members of the family,”82 or that “the family name is a 
property . . . to which even the State cannot impair/infringe without 
the consent of the family.”83  
Until the early 20th century, scholarly works maintained the 
confusion and alongside the courts, they continued to affirm that 
the legal action to protect one’s family name is the exercise of a 
property right.  Some, however, recognised that a true property 
right only offers legal protection to the owner of the property, not 
to the owner’s family.  In order to provide a more adequate 
explanation, they developed two lines of arguments.  Either they 
presented the name as a special type of property shared with 
several people,84 or they considered the name an example of co-
ownership.85  In any case, they did not question the affirmation of 
the name being property.  To the contrary, they perpetuated an 
explanation which associated the name with the ill-suited concept 
of property whereas the origins of the legal action they tried to 
explain rested on the saisine, which resisted any assimilation to 
property.  Understanding that the unchecked affirmation did not 
and could not rest on solid grounds shed light on English law’s 
understanding in Du Boulay. Because analysis of French legal 
history demonstrates that there is no link between protecting the 
name and property, a contrario, there cannot be a link between 
lack of protection of the name and lack of property rights in the 
name.  Thus when English law affirms the name is not property, it 
 
81. Paris, March 20th, 1826, S.V. 1825-1827, 2, 214 ; S. 1826 II 214. 
82. Paris, March 22nd, 1828 S.V. 1828-1830, 2, 60.  Was at stake here the 
action of a father agains the use of his name by his illegitimate son born out of 
adultery. 
83. Douai, December 26th, 1835 S. 1837 II 188; similarly, Riom, January 
2nd, 1865, D. 1865, 2, 17 ; Agen, June 26th, 1860, D. 1860, 2, 141. Overall, see 
E. Agostini, La protection du nom patronymique et la nature du droit au nom, 
DALLOZ chr. 313 (1973). 
84. For example, J. A. LALLIER, DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ DES NOMS ET DES TITRES 
(Giard 1890); it echoes the Court of Appeal of Riom, January 2nd, 1865 D.P. 
1865, 2, 17 “a right sui generis.” 
85. 4 J. BONNECASE, SUPPL. TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL DE BAUDRY-
LACANTINIERE § 290, at 566 (1928); for a summary, see M. Herzog-Evans, 
Autonomie de la volonté et nom. Un plaidoyer, RRJ 48-49 (1997); and NERAC, 
supra note 69, at 15-17. 
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cannot be because it does not protect the name against use by 
another (except for fraud).  
A similar conclusion applies to the other characteristic of the 
legal action recognised in French law and related to the conditions 
in which it operates. 
 
2. The Conditions of the Legal Action 
 
According to the traditional presentation, those entitled to bring 
a civil law suit to protect their name against use by another are not 
required to prove the existence of damage (prejudice).  
Assumption of the name suffices to justify their legal action.  In 
the original context of the saisine, this condition is not a surprise.  
The noble name is sufficiently known for its assumption by a third 
party to create injury to the family members by the association it 
brings between the stranger and the family.  In practice, there is 
damage, except that it is an implicit but obvious consequence of 
the assumption.  Proving the assumption equals proving the 
damage, and there is no need to require additional evidence.86  
However, the original context of the civil action being lost, 
scholars will be puzzled by the affirmation that there is no proof of 
damages, especially when compared to the conditions surrounding 
another legal action available to protect against the use of 
surnames by another, for the latter apparently requires the 
opposite, i.e. proof of damage.  Indeed, when a person tries to 
obtain confirmation of his new surname, he has to request a letter 
patent to the Crown, a procedure which evolved to incorporate a 
period of time during which people could oppose the change of 
name.  
Originally, this procedure developed as a consequence to the 
name and arms clause and is thus closely related to the other legal 
action the male heirs had.  It is the nobility that has an interest in 
opposing the grant of a letter patent, if it has not already engaged 
in direct legal action before the courts.  That interest, in its 
 
86. See the example given by LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 48 
where the Rochechouart-Mortemart sued their cousin Francois de Pontville-
Rochechouart for not bearing the name Rochechouart without their consent, but 
as a result of a name and arms clause.  Centuries later, the family of 
Rochechouart-Mortemart will be embroiled in another law suit, Cass. Civ. 1ère, 
January 31st, 1978 JCP 1979 II 19 035. 
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substance, does not differ from the one at stake in the civil action.  
Nonetheless, contrary to the civil courts, the Crown will expressly 
require its proof, probably as a means to retain full discretion on 
whether or not to grant the letter patent.87  The administrative 
procedure being incorporated into the law of 11 germinal an XI, 
and now into article 61 of the French Civil Code, proof of damage 
continues to be required, in contrast to the courts’ opposite 
affirmation.  
But like during the Ancien Régime, the difference does not 
really exist and some modern scholars have demonstrated this.88  
Indeed, despite continuing to affirm that no proof of damage was 
required, the civil courts never went on to accept any assumption 
of name as justifying the plaintiff’s legal action.  Paul Dupont (the 
John Smith of England) will never succeed in protecting his 
surname of Dupont if he restricts himself to prove that another 
used it.  The courts require more than that mere assumption and are 
in that sense respectful of the original purpose of the legal action.  
The protection given to the name was born out of the necessity 
for the nobility to maintain the prestige of a name and its 
associated arms and estate.  It is this prestige of a name that 
remains a constant preoccupation for the courts.  Assumption of an 
ordinary name requires proving a specific damage suffered;89 by 
contrast, assumption of a prestigious name or a name with 
originality can be sufficient.  In other words, the protection of the 
name the courts offer still depends on the same rationale that 
existed at the origin of the protection; the context may have 
changed for the nobility has been abolished, but the foundational 
principles remain because they can easily be transferred to non 
noble names.90
 
87. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 105, spec. n. 237. 
88. CARBONNIER, supra note 4, at 192; P. Kayser, La défense du nom de 
famille d’après la jurisprudence civile et d’après la jurisprudence 
administrative, 10 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 21, 27-29 (1959); and NÉRAC, supra note 
69, at 158-161.  
89.  Nérac demonstrated this caselaw element, id. at 158-159.  He even 
underlines that the civil and administrative courts hold the same line of 
approach, id. at 160. 
90. One could even argue that the new nobility of the 19th century are those 
celebrities and stars a lot of people seem to aspire to be, like in the previous 
centuries, people aspire to nobility. 
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This debate would not matter much if it had not been at the 
centre of a controversy about whether or not the name is property.  
To explain the (unchecked) affirmation that there is no need to 
prove damage before the civil courts, scholars consider that the 
condition of the legal action is a sure sign of a property right being 
exercised.  Indeed, not to require proof of damages is, in French 
law, a particularity of property law where assumption of the object 
of property suffices to create the damage.  Thus, the existence of  
legal action born out of the saisine seems to confirm that the name 
is property, and in the 19th century, the civil courts appeared to be 
justified in affirming that the right to the name embodied by the 
protection is a property right.  Obviously, to declare that the name 
is property completely ignores the reality of the case law.  For if 
the name was property, any name, whether common or rare, would 
deserve protection, because any thing, object of property, deserves 
protection, whether an old battered book or the priceless edition of 
an author’s work.  And yet, the courts adopt a different approach.  
It raises the question of how the debate about whether or not 
the name is property could have been so sidetracked and confused.  
That the old concept of the saisine, from which was born the first 
legal action, was lost, cannot be overstated as the cause of the 
problem.  Even lawyers who in the early 20th century challenged 
the concept of the name being property took for granted the courts’ 
affirmation that there was no need to prove damage.  Planiol, for 
example, acknowledged that “if the name is a property, it is 
possible for a person who bears it to ask others to respect it, 
without the need to prove that the assumption causes damage.”91  
But having demonstrated that the name cannot be property, he 
concluded that the civil courts erred in not requiring proof of 
damage and that the opposite stand taken by the Council of State 
should prevail in the other legal action available to protect one’s 
name.92  In other words, Planiol challenged what constitutes the 
original feature of the legal claim born out of the saisine.  The 
irony is that historically, the saisine, and therefore the name, never 
was property; thus, to affirm, like Planiol did, that the name is not 
property, should not cause the very characteristic of the legal 
action derived from the saisine to be disputed. 
 
91. PLANIOL, supra note 68, at 152, § 400. 
92.  Id. at 153, § 400. 
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Interestingly enough, Planiol sensed the original context of the 
legal action, albeit he reached the wrong conclusions.  For him, the 
confusion between property and the name rests on the association 
between the surname and the name of the land acquired by the 
nobility.93  He is not too far from the truth when noticing the link 
between the French law of surnames and the nobility:  the saisine 
served the nobility’s interests which were often linked at the time 
with interests in the land.  However, the relationship between the 
two never implied for the name to be property.  It is the French 
lawyers of the Ancien Régime who joined the two together in 
imitation of Roman law, rather than by identification of the name 
to the land or to a title (i.e. to property).  The same lack of 
historical knowledge and analysis about what the name really is led 
them and others to infer that the supposed absence to prove 
damages was a sure sign of property.  To understand how this 
interpretation spread dispels any doubt that comparison with 
English law could create confusion as to the nature of the name.  
The affirmation in English law that the name is not property should 
not be associated with the quasi-absence, in English law, of a civil 
action to protect one’s name.  Analysis of French law shows that 
there is no link between the two. 
In the French civil action to protect the name, the absence of 
proof of damage, said to be a sign of property, is more a rhetorical 
affirmation than a conclusion having any sound substantial basis.  
Certainly, that it remained unquestioned94 and unchecked until the 
middle of the 20th century95 contributed to the confusion between 
name and property in French law.96  Nonetheless, and strangely 
enough, it is not the analysis of the courts’ practice that will lead to 





93.  Id. at 152; and PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 68, at 141. 
94. Carbonnier wondered if the divergence between the civil and 
administrative courts was not exaggerated, CARBONNIER, supra note 4, at 192. 
95. Id. at n. 79. 
96. Even after those studies, confusion reappears from time to time, see R. 
LINDON, LES DROITS DE LA PERSONNALITÉ 177 (1983), who considers that the 
protection of the name can be explained as much by the theory of property right 
as by the concept of personality right. 
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B. The Rejection of the Confusion 
 
The doctrinal reaction against the property nature of the name 
arose at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, in 
two stages.  The confusion between name and property proved to 
be easy to dispel with regard to civil actions.  If the name were 
property, it would mean that several persons possess the name and 
exercise the same rights on this thing.97  However, in French law, a 
property right implies an exclusive ownership on an object, on a 
thing; there cannot be two owners of one thing with the same 
rights.  Thus, the name could not be property.  
In relation to the conditions of the legal action, the doctrine did 
not directly criticise the link made between a civil action in 
property law and one related to the protection of names, because in 
both cases, according to the courts, there is no need to prove 
damage.98  Rather, they tried to demonstrate that the alleged 
practice reflected other concepts than property rights.  They were 
helped in that by recent developments in case law.  
By the late 19th century, the courts extended the protection of 
the name against personal use to use for literature purposes.  They 
did so on the basis of property rights in the name,99 although they 
required the plaintiff to prove damage and an interest to claim.  As 
scholars observed, such requirement was adverse to the concept of 
property rights; more importantly, what was defended was not the 
name as property/good, but the name as the embodiment of a 
person and his/her personality or civil status.  Linking this analysis 
of the protection against artistic use to that of the protection against 
personal use, the doctrine proposed a renewed interpretation of the 
French law of surnames that radically breaks with the concept of 
property rights.  
At the turn of the 20th century, to protect one’s name against 
use by another is no longer viewed as a sign of a property right, but 
 
97. PLANIOL, supra note 68, at 151; PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 68, at 
141; and 1 RIPERT & BOULANGER, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL D’APRES LE TRAITE DE 
PLANIOL 377 (LGDJ 1956).  
98.  To the exception of Planiol, id. 
99. Trib. Seine, February 15th, 1882, S. 1882, 2, 21; see LEFEBVRE-
TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 183-184. 
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the consequence of the name being an element of civil status100 
and the object of an extra-patrimonial right.101  As we have seen 
regarding the disposal of a person’s name, the emphasis is put on 
the intrinsic values a person carries with him, without looking at 
their monetary/economic worth.102  It is the person who is at stake; 
because the name embodies a person both in its individual and 
family dimensions, it deserves protection whenever another person 
uses it, even if there is no fraud.  Thus to the name is attached an 
extra-patrimonial right, not a property right. 
The new rationale did not lead to challenge the traditional 
presentation that the civil courts do not require proof of damage 
when the personal use of another’s name is at stake.  Nothing is 
said about the contradiction of using the same rationale for the two 
actions but differentiating on their conditions.  And if the link with 
the administrative procedure available to protect one’s name is not 
made anymore, again the latter procedure is said to rest on proof of 
damage and is still in contrast with the civil action for personal 
use–even though nowadays, some scholars argue that there is no 
difference. 
Nonetheless, the concept of extra-patrimonial right definitely 
excludes any reference to property right.  In that sense, French law 
finally reached the same conclusion as English law: the name is 
not property.  Yet, behind this common perception of what the 
name is not, lies a different conception of the person.  English law 
does not know the concept of extra-patrimonial rights and presents 
its own limited protection of the name as part of the law of torts,103 
notably the protection of the name against its use for artistic 
purposes when that use falls within the remits of the tort of 
defamation.  Certainly, French law does not ignore this link with 
torts as the legal actions are predicated on articles 1382 and 1383 
of the Civil Code.104  However, the related case law does not fall 
under those articles but under article 57 of the Civil Code, which is 
related to the registration of birth.  And none of the torts textbooks 
 
100. A. Colin, D. 1904 II 1, commentary under Paris January 21st, 1903. A. 
COLIN & H. CAPITANT, COURS ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 360 
(Dalloz 1923).  
101. PERREAU, supra note 11. 
102. There are other extra-patrimonial rights: right to life, right to honour, 
right to one’s own image, right to privacy. 
103. Du Boulay, at 446-447; and Cowley, at 460. 
104. Influence of Planiol, PLANIOL, supra note 68, at 153, § 401. 
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analyse the case law, leaving this aspect of the law to the books 
dealing with Introduction to French Law or Law of Persons (droit 
des personnes).  It is as if French law’s vision of the person and 
his/her name supersedes any other approach.  It is not simply that 
the name is not property; it is that the name cannot be property 
because it incarnates the person.  It is this vision that will 
ultimately maintain the difference that arose, in the early 19th 
century, between English and French laws in relation to another 
feature of the law of surname:  the liberty to change names.  How 
this liberty figured in the debate about the name being property 
needs now to be investigated. 
 
III. TO CHANGE ONE’S NAME:  
AN INDICATION OF A PROPERTY RIGHT? 
 
The liberty to change one’s name was never argued as the 
exercise of a property right.  In English law it still exists, and in 
French law it existed despite the name being associated at the time 
with property.  Paradoxically, it is the loss of liberty to change 
names in French law which reinforced the claim that the name was 
property; a claim made, as we have seen, in relation to both the 
name and arms clause and the protection against use by another.  
The origin of the issue is indeed the establishment of the 
immutability principle (A), the stringent effects of which the courts 
set to counteract by maintaining the rhetorical but convenient 
affirmation that the name was property (B) before the doctrine 
moved away from such confusion.  
 
A. The Origin of the Issue: Establishing Immutability of Names in 
French Law 
 
The liberty to change names was a basic feature of the French 
law of surnames until the Revolution, as much as it was, and still 
is, in English law.  However, during the three centuries preceeding 
the Revolution, the French monarchy conducted a policy to restrict 
the liberty to change names in order to control the nobility, which 
was seen as a threat to the Monarch’s power, as well as with a 
view to strengthen the civil registry applicable to all subjects.  The 
Crown used two tools:  the procedure of letters patent and the 
ordinance of 1667 on civil procedure.  With the first, which gave 
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discretion to the Crown to refuse or accept the request, the Crown 
tried to control the change of names and arms the nobility 
undertook.  However, despite the progressive increase of letters 
patent since the 16th century, their numbers remained low.105  
With the ordinance of 1667, the Crown found a more efficient 
way to restrict the liberty to change names. Indeed, the ordinance 
of 1667, by requiring proof of age, marriage and death by the civil 
register rather than by witnesses’ testimony,106 progressively 
obliged ordinary people to keep the name they had been registered 
under at birth and later at marriage.  Establishing an efficient civil 
status registry enabled the monarchy to create more obstacles for 
people to change their names. 
Hence, compared with England, France took a rather different 
path.  Where France strengthened the monarch’s power, the 
English monarchy abandoned the inclination to impose absolutism.  
As a consequence, the relationship between the State and its 
citizens or subjects was that of fierce non-interference.  For matters 
concerning only the individual, like the name–and as long it was 
not linked with claiming a title–the English Crown could not 
intervene without being perceived as an arbitrary power infringing 
on civil liberties.107  As a result, the civil status registry would not 
be imposed before the middle of the 19th century, but it would 
never be associated with control of the name.  In addition, a 
person’s actual and official names can be different from what has 
been written on the birth certificate.108
 
105. It is inferior to the number of letters patent to secure legitimacy, 
LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 106, notably n. 241. 
106. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 94-95; G. Sicard, L’identité 
historique, in L’IDENTITE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE. ETUDE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS 
ET DE DROIT COMPARE 115, 133-137 (Pousson-Petit dir., Bruylant 2002).  
107. J. Pousson-Petit, L’identité de la personne humaine au Royaume-Uni, 
in L’IDENTITE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE. ETUDE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS ET DE 
DROIT COMPARE 343, 345-351 (Pousson-Petit dir., Bruylant 2002); and J. 
Pousson-Petit, Conclusion, in L’IDENTITE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE. ETUDE DE 
DROIT FRANÇAIS ET DE DROIT COMPARE 979, 982 (Pousson-Petit dir., Bruylant 
2002).  
108. The Birth Registration Act 1953 does not allow for a change of 
surname to be registered on the birth certificate.  Thus a change of surname will 
be recorded most of the time by deed poll, 35 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 
1276, at 770 (4th ed. 1994) v. “Personal Property;” and J. F. JOSLING, CHANGE 
OF NAME 23-46 (Oyez Pub. Ltd 1980). 
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Nonetheless, the difference between England and France until 
the Revolution should not be overstated.  In France, the King’s 
attempts to curb the liberty to change name never led to the 
adoption of a general ordinance to prohibit changes of the name 
without his authorisation.  However absolute the power of the King 
was, it was never so absolute as to override Roman law and 
custom, on both of which the liberty to change names rests.109  It is 
thus not surprising that most lawyers up to the middle of the 18th 
century agreed that people were at liberty to change name,110 and 
the practice reflected this liberty.  In the rare cases where letters 
patent were sought to secure a change of name, they would 
sometimes be granted 50 years after the change occurred.111
Therefore, the lack of liberty to change names is a “recent 
invention”112 in the French law of surnames.  It is with the 
Revolution in 1789 that the monarchy’s aspiration to control 
mutability of names became a reality.  The Revolution not only 
confirmed the civil status registry, with its emphasis on the name 
as a means of identification, but it also took the step in 1794 to 
affirm the immutability of names; this was extended  to all citizens 
with the abolition of the nobility on August 4th, 1789.  The breach 
with the past was consumed, and the French law of surnames 
ceased to be similar to its English counterpart.  The various 
governments following the Revolution never questioned the 
revolutionary legislation, but rather reinforced it in 1803 by 
creating a procedure to change names–inspired by the previous 
system of letters patent–and in 1858, by criminalising the 
assumption of names when it included an assumption of titles. 
This importance of the principle of immutability of names 
cannot be over emphasised, not only because it introduced a major 
shift between the English and French laws of surnames, but 
because it led to a misunderstanding about the origins of the 
 
109. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 109. 
110. Id. at 103-104 
111. Id. at 109. In this example, the will was drafted in 1662, the name and 
arms taken in 1692, but the change of name secured only in 1747 by letters 
patent, the claimant wishing “to prevent any matter of trouble and to secure 
better the right that the ascendant and father transmitted to him” (author’s 
translation). 
112. Herzog-Evans, supra note 85, at 56; F. Thibaut, Le nom patronymique 
et l’attitude de l’Etat français à l’égard des changements de nom, RRJ 17, 21 
(1989). 
52              JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES                  [Vol. 1 
 
                                                                                                            
French law of surnames, which fuelled in return a propensity in the 
19th century to declare the name to be property, up to the point that 
the created story found its way to the Privy Council in the 1869 
case of Du Boulay. 
At the end of the Revolution, doctrine and the courts asserted 
that the former monarchy forbade all changes of names that it did 
not authorise.  Although a myth, this historical perspective resulted 
from a series of works, notably that of La Roque, in his treatises on 
nobility (1678) and on the name (1681).113  He not only falsified 
an ordinance of 1555, where the King indeed forbade the change of 
names (though not in the terms the author mentioned), but he also 
conveniently forgot to mention that the ordinance was actually 
never registered, and thus never applied.114  This presentation 
echoed the monarchy’s need, and later the Revolution’s wishes, to 
ascertain control on the name as an element of civil status.  Such 
an opportunity to find an “old” text ascertaining the principle of 
immutability of names was too good to be discarded and the 
fabricated historical justification of the principle found its way in 
to one of the main legal dictionaries115 just before the Revolution 
broke.  Given that the author of the 1785 text, Henrion de Pansey, 
became President of the Court of Cassation after the Revolution, it 
is hardly surprising that nobody questioned the source.  Certainly 
Merlin,116 who was not necessarily on good terms with De Pansey, 
tried to research the matter, but was only able to find that the 
 
113. GILLES-ANDRE DE LA ROQUE, TRAITE DE LA NOBLESSE ET DE TOUTES 
SES DIFFERENTES ESPECES (1678), availalbe at http://gallica.bnf.fr (last visited 
November 6, 2008); and GILLES-ANDRE DE LA ROQUE, TRAITE DE L’ORIGINE 
DES NOMS ET DES SURNOMS, DE LEUR DIVERSITE, DE LEURS PROPRIETES, DE 
LEURS CHANGEMENS, TANT CHEZ LES ANCIENS PEUPLES QUE CHEZ LES FRANÇAIS, 
LES ESPAGNOLS, LES ANGLAIS, LES ALLEMANS, LES POLONAIS, LES SUEDOIS, LES 
ITALIENS AUTRES NATIONS (1681). 
114. The deception was uncovered by A. Lefebvre-Teillard to which this 
paragraph is indebted, see LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 96-101. 
115. GUYOT, supra note 32. 
116. Merlin (1754-1838), said Merlin de Douai (of Douai–a French town), 
was a solicitor before one of the highest courts in France before the French 
Revolution, le Parlement de Paris; and he edited the original edition of the 
Repertoire Guyot in 1784-1785.  During the Revolution, he proposed to abolish 
feudality and to establish one single supreme court, the future Court of 
Cassation.  A very active supporter of the Revolution throughout the ten years it 
lasted, he managed to escape the onslaught of the Terror and, with Napoleon in 
power, became in 1801 the Procureur Imperial to the Court of Cassation. 
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ordinance of 1555 was probably not registered; he was unable to 
undo completely the Ariane’s thread that the story represented.  
Hence, the ordinance of 1555 found its way into the nineteenth-
century French law of surnames as a text that supposed to support 
the idea that the immutability of names had always been an 
essential feature of the French law of surnames, long before the 
Revolution chose to enact the law of 6 fructidor an II.  Lawyers 
forgot that the French law of surnames was actually different, 
although the cases between 1800 and 1850 reveal that citizens 
needed a bit more persuasion and time to become accustomed to 
the new prohibition on the change of names without the prior 
authorisation of the government.117
The deception about what the actual French law of surnames 
was prior to the Revolution could have remained of no 
consequence for the purpose of this study, but it found its way in to 
the very case where English law affirms its divergence with French 
law, at least as understood at the time by French lawyers.  Indeed, 
in Du Boulay, the Privy Council had to examine what the French 
law of surnames was prior to and after the French Revolution.  
According to the treaty of 1815, French law applied to the 
Caribbean island of Saint Lucia.  Not surprisingly, the discussion 
turned to whether the ordinance of 1555 had ever been applied.118  
The plaintiffs argued it had, and in support of their argument 
referred to the 1823 case of Les Heritiers de Preaux de 
Longchamps.119  The French Court of Cassation concluded that the 
ordinance of 1555 “although might not have been registered, was 
however the manifestation of the royal prerogative”120 according 
to which “to the King only belongs the authorisation to change 
names.”121  Furthermore, the Court of Cassation considered that as 
 
117. See for example CE May 24th, 1851 S. 1851 II 665.  In a decision 
about the validity of a change granted in accordance with the correct procedure 
of the law of germinal an XI, the Council of State notes that “the investigation 
reveals that, for a long time, Eugene and Jacques-Jules had been in possession of 
the name Gaubert,” being known in their locality (i.e. the island of Martinique) 
by that name. 
118. With the added difficulty that Saint Lucia was a colony and as such 
must have had its laws specially registered. 
119. Cass. Req., November 16th 1824, S.V. 1822-1824, 1, 561; S. 1825, 1, 
148. 
120.  Cass. Req., November 16th 1824, S.V. 1822-1824, 1, 561, 563. 
121.  Id. 
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such, the ordinance of 1555 applied to the French Caribbean island 
of Guadeloupe, an island which had the same legal status as Saint 
Lucia while both were under French dominion.  Clearly the 
decision supports the plaintiffs’ arguments.  However, Lord 
Phillimore, for the Privy Council, never addressed the case; at least 
not in his written opinion transcribed in the Law Reports.  In 
addition, he adopted the opposite conclusion to that of the Court of 
Cassation:  “at all events, it is not shown that this unregistered 
ordinance ever formed part of the law of Saint Lucia.”122  How one 
can then explain such divergence of understanding?  
Certainly, Lord Phillimore gave an accurate description of the 
French law of surnames prior to the Revolution, noting that 
“Merlin, in his Repertoire . . . says that the ordinance not having 
been registered, never became law in France.”123  Yet, he also 
added that according to the Dalloz dictionary, “the courts hold a 
contrary opinion,”124 a quote which the 1823 French case 
illustrated.  So why was there such a departure from the Court of 
Cassation’s own interpretation?  Several explanations can be put 
forward: the difficulty to know French law precisely (the 1823 case 
does not seem to have been discussed before the courts, and one 
wonders if it ever has been); or the social background of the 
defendant (the illegitimate son of a former slave of the plaintiffs’ 
family–upholding French law as interpreted by the Court of 
Cassation may have served to maintain the social division).  It may 
also be the Privy Council was reluctant to condone an 
interpretation it probably sensed as being inaccurate.  Indeed, 
analysing the 1823 case cited by the plaintiffs reveals a hidden 
agenda for the French Court: affirming at all costs the immutability 
of names.  
If the Court of Cassation relied so heavily on the ordinance of 
1555 as enouncing a principle that has always been recognised, it 
is because it needed a legal basis to refuse the change of name 
undertook by one of the parties.  The Court of Cassation could not 
rely on the ordinance of 1803, which prohibits changes without 
Governmental approval, as it had been registered in Guadeloupe 
only in 1823, a few years after the facts took place.  The Court of 
Cassation also knew that the validity of the ordinance of 1555 was 
 
122. Du Boulay, at 446. 
123. Id.  
124. Id.  
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an issue, but to be faithful to historical truth would then have 
forced the Court to validate the change of name done without 
authorisation.  At a time when the French Government was 
painstakingly enforcing the opposite principle, such course of 
action would have opened the door to much trouble and lawsuits.  
The Court of Cassation was not ready to take the risk, and 
preferred enforcing a supposedly ever-existing principle of 
immutability embodied in the ordinance of 1555.  One can see here 
the driving force that modelled the French law of surnames during 
the 19th century.  Immutability of names had to be maintained at all 
costs. 
This emphasis on immutability of names in French law clearly 
contrasts with the English law perception of allowing complete 
freedom to choose and change names.  Again, it may explain why 
the Privy Council was reluctant to follow the Court of Cassation.  
But for our debate about whether the name is or is not property, 
this emphasis only matters because of what it created.  To insist so 
much on immutability meant that the French courts were 
sometimes placed in a difficult position when plaintiffs asked for a 
rectification of the civil status registry in situations where clearly at 
stake was a change of name rather than a modification of a clerical 
error on the registry books.  The only way out was to resort to the 
traditional view that the name was property, as the plaintiffs in Du 
Boulay reminded the Privy Council. 
 
B. Solving the Issue: Promoting Property Rights vs Promoting 
Extra-Patrimonial Rights 
 
Rectification of civil status registry could only be granted if 
there had been a mistake in the transcription of the name in the 
registry.  But what constituted a mistake?  Some people argued that 
they used to bear a name with de for example, and that by mistake 
the particle (particule) was dropped, or that they bore another 
name in addition to the one on the registry or in substitution to the 
one registered, and that by mistake the other name was dropped on 
the birth certificate.  Except that the so-called mistake was often a 
deliberate move rather than the result of a civil officer’s 
absentmindedness.  During the Revolution, to register the de–often 
but not always a sign of nobility–was a sure sign of trouble, if not a 
death sentence in some circumstances in the middle of the Reign of 
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Terror in France.  Some people had to go as far as changing their 
entire name such as “leroy” (literally “the king”) to survive those 
difficult times.  So to drop part of one’s name to avoid being 
suspected of being a counter-revolutionary was a deliberate move 
for survival.  In that sense, there was no error and the principle of 
immutability of names should have meant that the courts had to 
refuse the request for rectification of the civil register.  On the 
other hand, the courts could not be insensitive to the plight of the 
plaintiffs, who acted more by constraint than by choice; they were 
tempted to accede to the request, but they could only do so if they 
found a legal basis that would weight enough to counteract the 
effect of the principle of immutability that they paradoxically 
promoted.  If they found it, they would then just need to ensure 
that the claim was genuine and not an indirect way to gain a name 
that the plaintiffs never had or abandoned long before the 
Revolution. 
The French law of surnames, at the time, offered them the 
perfect reason: the name was property and thus the claimants just 
had to prove they “owned” the name, “possessed” it, i.e. used it for 
a long time before the crucial years of the Revolution.  In other 
words, in order to resolve the dilemma they felt they faced, the 
courts used the old features of what was historically the saisine, 
and used the theoretical background which superseded the 
medieval concept, i.e. property rights.  With the old features of the 
saisine, they found a way to establish a criterion to assess whether 
or not the claim was genuine.  It sufficed to ask if there was a “use 
of long tempo” as the old French law of surnames defined it (use 
which is public, quiet, not contested, and for a long time–a notion 
broad enough to give them flexibility in analysing the facts of a 
particular case).  With the theoretical background created by 
lawyers at the end of the Middle Ages, they had a principle as 
strong as the principle of immutability, so strong in fact, that the 
courts could use it to downplay the stringent effects of the 
principle of immutability without appearing to neglect the principle 
of immutability.  After all, property was a right engraved in the 
French Declaration of Human Rights and with liberty, it was a key 
foundation of the Civil Code.  How could the Government oppose 
a property right without being accused, at least implicitly, of 
undermining the very foundational elements of France?  Therefore, 
the concept of property conveniently found a new life.  Originally 
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a way to integrate the medieval law of the saisine to the prestigious 
Roman law, without questioning the freedom to change names as 
recognised by custom and supported by Roman law, it became a 
tool to instil more liberty into what became a very rigid system 
governed by the principle of immutability of surnames and of civil 
registry. 
As a consequence, the more emphasis there was on 
immutability, the more emphasis there was on property rights.  
Yet, the association between name and property rights did not 
result from a logical analysis of the concept of property in relation 
to the features of the French law of surnames.  Rather, it was based 
on policy matters estranged to the concept of property.  When the 
concept of property was at last dropped–in the beginning of the 
20th century, after scholars demonstrated it was inappropriate and 
illogical–the issue remained: how to find a balance between 
affirming immutability of names and allowing for some changes 
that take place over time?  To resolve it, the courts simply went on 
applying the same criteria without referring anymore to the 
original explanation put forward in the 19th century.  Hence, this 
last debate confirms how the interrogatory about whether or not the 
name is property has been tainted in French law by factors 
independent from the concept of property, factors like the 
immutability of surnames.  The contrast with English law could 
not be greater.  
Even now, that both English and French law agree that the 
name is not property, they still differ in what this affirmation 
reveals about their conception of the person in relation to his name.  
English law sees the name as part of the one’s personal privacy, 
free from interference from the State; French law, despite 
recognising to the person an extra-patrimonial right to protect his 
name, does not consider the person to be at liberty to choose and 
change surnames.125  Therefore, the real philosophical and legal 
 
125. The evolution of French law is towards more autonomy granted to the 
person in choosing names (see Acts 2002-2003), see Herzog-Evans, supra note 
85, at 65; S. Shindler-Viguie, La liberté de choix du nom des personnes 
physiques, art. 35942 DEFRESNOIS 1409, 1410, 1425 (1994); J.-J. Lemouland, Le 
choix du prénom et du nom en droit français, in in L’IDENTITE DE LA PERSONNE 
HUMAINE. ETUDE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS ET DE DROIT COMPARE 631, 669 (Pousson-
Petit dir., Bruylant 2002); and H. Lécuyer, L’identité de la personne (Pour 
l’abrogation des lois des 4 mars 2002 et 18 juin 2003 sur le nom de famille), 
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divergence between modern English and French law is thus not on 
whether or not the name is property, but on what the relationship is 




To our original question, “is the name property?”, the answer is 
certainly “no” with regards to three elements of the law of 
surnames: whether a person can or cannot dispose of one’s own 
name, protect it, and change it.  Although until the beginning of the 
20th century French law used to affirm the name was inalienable 
property, it did so more for lack of a better suited concept to 
explain the features of its law of surnames, or to serve other 
purposes, than out of a flawless analysis of the concept of property.  
It is because the medieval concept of the saisine, which was 
neither property nor possession, had been lost that French lawyers 
integrated other notions, like property, to provide a theoretical 
justification of the law of surnames.  
Amid the confused history of the French law of surnames, 
English law appears to act as a focal point, especially concerning 
two of the features French law used to have before the 1789 
Revolution, i.e. the liberty to dispose of one’s name by contract or 
will and the liberty to change one’s name without prior 
authorisation of the Government.  Its affirmation that the name is 
not property appears to match the historical sources of the French 
law of surnames, although it remains to be proved whether the two 
have identical origins.  The latter, contrasted with the dramatic 
changes French law underwent from the 1789 Revolution onwards, 
highlights how its vision of the person and his/her name, which lies 
behind the affirmation that the name is not property, is now very 
different from that of French law.  English law opted for freedom, 
refusing to consider that a person’s identity depends on her name; 
French law opted for control, partly because of the importance 
attached to the name as part of the civil status, and partly because it 
identifies the person with his name.  
The debate about the nature of the name is not on whether the 
name is property or not, but on what the relationship should be 
 
 
131 LES PETITES AFFICHES 31 (July 1st, 2004).  But the contrast with English 
law remains striking.  
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between a person and his name.  And yet, albeit outside the scope 
of this article, some issues remain which partly leave open the 
debate about whether or not the name is property.  The concept of 
“privacy” as developed in U.S. law borrows both from the 
concepts of property and personality; and in French law, some 
argue for the name used for artistic purposes to be part of the 
patrimoine, object of property rights, challenging the traditional 
classification established in the beginning of the 20th century.126  
More sketches to answer our question need to be done . . .  
 
126. M. Bui-Leturcq, Patrimonialité, droits de la personnalité et protection 
de la personne, une association cohérente, DROIT PROSPECTIF–RRJ 767, 781 
(2006). 
